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BECKER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal centers on the question
w h e t h e r  t h e  I m m i g r a t i o n  a n d
Naturalization Service (“INS”) can apply
a new law retroactively in a way that will
alter the immigration consequences of an
immigrant’s decision made under prior
law.1  Under former § 212(c) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed 1996),
deportable aliens who had accrued seven
years of lawful permanent residence in the
United States could request discretionary
relief from deportation by arguing that the
equities weighed in favor of their
remaining in the United States.  Even an
alien deportable because he had been
convicted of an aggravated felony, see 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (1994), was
eligible for such discretionary relief if he
served a term of imprisonment less than
five years.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c).
Section 212(c) was repealed in
September 1996, when Congress passed
the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”),
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
Section 304(b) of IIRIRA repealed §
212(c) relief entirely, replacing it with a
procedure called “cancellation of
removal,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (1996),
and providing that cancellation of removal
is not available to an alien convicted of
any aggravated felony.  This provision was
consistent with section 440(d) of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified in relevant part at 8
U.S.C. § 1182 (1996)), enacted shortly
    1Since March 1, 2003, the INS has
been part of the Department of
Homeland Security.  The activity
involved in this case is now carried on by
the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement.  However, since the case
began as an INS matter, we shall
continue to refer to the INS.
3before IIRIRA, which rendered aliens
convicted of aggravated felonies,
regardless of the length of their sentence,
ineligible for discretionary relief from
deportation under former § 212(c).
In INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326
(2001), the Supreme Court held that
discretionary relief under former § 212(c)
“remains available for aliens . . . whose
convictions were obtained through plea
agreements and who . . . would have been
eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time of
their plea under the law then in effect.”  In
St. Cyr, the Court needed to determine
whether IIRIRA section 304(b) applied
retroactively.  After concluding that
Congress did not provide a sufficiently
clear command with respect to the
temporal reach of the repeal of former §
212(c) by IIRIRA section 304(b), the
Court applied the next step of the familiar
principles of Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), to
determine whether the repeal had an
impermissible retroactive effect.  Landgraf
cataloged a history of Supreme Court
precedent establishing a “presumption
against statutory retroactivity,” id. at 270,
in the absence of a clear command from
Congress.  A statute will be impermissibly
retroactive when it attaches new legal
consequences to prior events because its
application “would impair rights a party
possessed when he acted, increase a
party’s liability for past conduct, or impose
new duties with respect to transactions
already completed.”  Id. at 280.  The
question whether a new statute attaches
new legal consequences to prior conduct
“demands a commonsense, functional
judgment” that “should be informed and
guided by ‘familiar considerations of fair
notice, reasonable reliance, and settled
expectations.’”  Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S.
343, 357-58 (1999) (quoting Landgraf,
511 U.S. at 270).
In St. Cyr, the Court concluded that the
retroactive application of IIRIRA section
304(b) would have an impermissible
retroactive effect on aliens—such as St.
Cyr—who had pleaded guilty prior to the
repeal of § 212(c).  The Court highlighted
the quid pro quo of the criminal plea
agreement, and reasoned that because
aliens like St. Cyr almost certainly relied
upon the likelihood of receiving
discretionary relief in deciding whether to
forgo their right to a trial, the elimination
of any possibility of § 212(c) relief by
IIRIRA has an obvious and severe
retroactive effect.  This appeal presents the
question whether application of IIRIRA
section 304(b) would have a similarly
impermissible retroactive effect on the
petitioner, Murali Krishna Ponnapula.
Ponnapula turned down a misdemeanor
plea agreement, went to trial when former
§ 212(c) was still in effect, and was
convicted of a felony by the jury; he went
to trial in reliance on the advice of his
counsel that, even if he were found guilty,
he would very likely not receive a sentence
that would render him ineligible for §
212(c) relief, because of his very minor
role in the offense.
Rejecting the position of the
government that Ponnapula is precluded
from claiming retroactive effect by reason
4of the discussion in St. Cyr, we conclude
that St. Cyr is simply one application of
the general principles articulated in
Landgraf that counsel against interpreting
statutes to have retroactive effect.  Here,
with respect to an alien who reasonably
could have relied on the potential
availability of § 212(c) relief, application
of the Landgraf principles shows that
I IRIRA sec t ion  304(b)  has  an
impe rmis s ib le  r e t roac t ive  ef fec t.
Moreover, on this record, where the
petitioner demonstrated clear and
reasonable actual reliance on the former
statutory scheme in making the decision to
go to trial, there is a fortiori an
impermissible retroactive effect.  We
begin with the facts of Ponnapula’s case.
I.
A.
In 1993, a New York state grand jury
indicted Ponnapula, along with several
other defendants, for grand larceny in the
first degree, N.Y. Penal Law § 155.42, and
falsifying business records in the first
degree, N.Y. Penal Law § 175.10.
Essentially the offense involved a
fraudulent application submitted to the
Bank of India for a loan to generate
working capital, secured by a valuable
parking lot located near LaGuardia Airport
in New York City.  The loan application
was submitted by a group headed by
Ponnapula’s brother, Dr. P.S. Prasad.
Prasad and his assistant, Vijay Dandapani,
prepared a loan application in the name of
a shell company, listed Ponnapula as its
nominal president, and submitted an
inflated personal net worth statement over
his name.  The loan was eventually
approved.  However, the undisputed
evidence established that Prasad and
Dandapani did all of this without
Ponnapula’s knowledge, and that
Dandapani forged Ponnapula’s signature
on both the loan application and the net
worth statement.  
Over the next year, Ponnapula and the
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office
engaged in plea negotiations.  The District
Attorney’s Office offered to allow him to
plead guilty to a misdemeanor with a
probationary sentence.  Ponnapula
considered the offer and the immigration
consequences of pleading guilty versus
going to trial.  His counsel advised him
that if he was convicted, he would very
likely receive the minimum sentence of
only one to three years’ imprisonment,
which is less than the five years necessary
to disqualify an alien from § 212(c) relief.
Accordingly, Ponnapula reasonably
believed that even if he were convicted of
a felony after trial he would still likely be
eligible for hardship relief from
deportation pursuant to former § 212(c).
In reliance on this advice, Ponnapula
decided to turn down the misdemeanor
offer and proceeded to trial.  On December
20, 1994, he was convicted of both counts
in the indictment.  He was sentenced to the
minimum term of imprisonment—one to
three years.
The advice of Ponnapula’s counsel,
and his reliance thereon, is easily
understandable, for the evidence at trial
5barely established criminality.  Indeed,
Ponnapula’s participation was so limited
that the trial judge set aside the jury’s
guilty verdict and dismissed the indictment
as to Ponnapula, for reasons chronicled in
the margin.2  It is also noteworthy that
while the loan application contained false
statements, the bank was well secured, and
recovered $1.35 million of the $1.9 million
loan amount when it ultimately sold the
parking lot.  However, the order setting
aside the conviction was eventually
reversed on appeal and the conviction
reinstated.
 Upon remand, the trial court imposed
the mandatory minimum term of one to
three years imprisonment on this New
York State “B” felony,  see N.Y. Penal
Law § 155.42, but the trial judge
recommended to the New York State
Corrections Department that it “consider
[defendant] for an early release program
that encompasses work release.”
Ponnapula then filed a petition for habeas
relief in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York.
    2According to Judge Carruthers:
The People presented no
evidence that Murali participated
in any way in the inclusion of any
false statements contained in the
loan application, or that Murali
knew that the loan documents
contained any false
representations.  The People’s
most important witness,
Dandapani, testified that Murali
was not informed of
misrepresentations that Prasad
ordered Dandapani and Shetty to
include in the loan application and
the supporting documents.  Murali
could not have learned from the
documents themselves that Prasad
was deceiving the bank.  The
evidence shows that Murali never
had a chance to examine them. 
Thus, Murali was in no position to
detect even the glaring
misrepresentations concerning his
finances that were contained in
the loan applications.
With respect to the documents
that Murali signed at the closing,
Dandapani and Krasner, the
bank’s attorney, each testified that
Murali only glanced at the papers,
but did not read them before
signing.  Moreover, there was no
evidence that Murali signed the
documents with knowledge that
Prasad intended to misapply the
proceeds of the loan . . . .
. . . . [T]he People’s key
witness, Vijay Dandapani,
testified unequivocally that Murali
never knew of the
misrepresentations made to the
bank in the loan application.  The
remainder of the evidence
presented by the People simply
fails to support the contention that
Murali was a knowing participant
in any misrepresentations made by
Prasad or his assistants with
regard to the loan.
6While concluding that the evidence had
been legally sufficient to sustain
petitioner’s conviction of a larceny
involving more than one million dollars,
and that he was constrained to deny federal
habeas relief, Judge Rakoff observed:
[P]e t it i one r’s  counse l  has
convinced me that his client was,
for lack of a better term, the small
fry o r—maybe even bette r
term — the schnook of  this
particular group of miscreants.
And though I have no power
other than the power to comment
on what should be done now in
terms of his incarceration, for what
it’s worth, it seems to me it would
certainly be in the interests of
justice for him to be released on
work release.
After Ponnapula was allowed out on
work release, the INS filed a detainer and
warrant for a removal hearing on October
2, 2000, and pursuant to New York law
Ponnapula was returned to state custody.
On January 8, 2001, after a hearing, an
immigration judge found Ponnapula
removable from the United States.  On
appeal, the BIA affirmed, holding that St.
Cyr could not be extended beyond
defendants who had pleaded guilty.  On
May 7, 2002, after two years of
incarceration on his conviction, the New
York State Department of Correctional
Services released Ponnapula.  Upon his
release, the INS took him into custody and
transferred him to the Pike County,
Pennsylvania jail for detention.  On May 8,
2002, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
Ponnapula filed the habeas petition that is
the subject of this appeal.
B.
In analyzing the petition for hardship
relief, the District Court reasoned that it
was “presented with the very narrow legal
question of whether . . . to apply IIRIRA
retroactively to [Ponnapula].”  Ponnapula
v. Ashcroft, 235 F. Supp. 2d 397, 402
(M.D. Pa. 2002).  However, it decided that
the exemption-stripping provision in
IIRIRA could not be applied, “[g]iven the
factual underpinnings of this case,” id.,
and it concluded that Ponnapula was
entitled to apply for hardship relief.  More
specifically, the District Court found that
the “[e]limination of any possibility of
former § 212(c) relief by IIRIRA has an
obvious and severe retroactive effect on
persons like Petitioner who relied on
settled expectations of the immigration
laws in place at the time he turned down a
plea bargain and decided to go to trial.”
Id. at 403.  It also found that “A major
factor in his decision not to accept the
offer was the lack of any distinction for the
purposes of § 212(c) relief between a
misdemeanor and felony conviction.”  Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Summarizing its position, the District
Court ruled that “[i]n deciding not to
accept the plea bargain offered, but instead
to go to trial, Petitioner conformed his
conduct to the settled expectation that §
212(c) relief would be available.
Accordingly, the court finds that
foreclosing § 212(c) relief to Petitioner
would have an impermissible retroactive
7effect.”  Id. at 406.
Because Ponnapula had lived
continuously in the United States for seven
years and had been sentenced to less than
five years’ imprisonment, he would have
been eligible for § 212(c) relief had it not
been eliminated.  Indeed, it would appear
from the record that he would likely have
been granted it:  Ponnapula’s wife and two
children as well as several of his brothers
are naturalized United States citizens.  All
of them live in this country.  Ponnapula’s
fourteen-year-old and twenty-year-old
daughters do not speak Telgu, the native
language of their parents.  With the
exception of the first one and one-half
years of the older daughter’s infancy, each
has spent a total of only six weeks in India
in their entire lives.  The youngest
daughter is in the ninth grade, and removal
of her father would lead to her mother
leaving the country, and would force the
daughter to reside in a place where she has
no ties and does not speak the language.
Indeed, Ponnapula had been approved to
become a United States citizen and was
planning to take the oath in 1993, but did
not do so because he was indicted for this
offense before the oath could be
administered.
II.
A.
It will be useful to set forth a brief
description of the statutory regime in place
prior to 1996 and the passage of AEDPA
and IIRIRA.  Under that regime, pursuant
to § 212(c), a lawful permanent resident
convicted of a deportable offense was
statutorily eligible to seek from the
Attorney General discretionary relief from
depor ta tion .  See  8  U .S.C . §
1182(d)(1994).  Prior to IIRIRA,
immigrants who were deportable on the
basis of a criminal offense could apply for
§ 212(c) relief so long as they had lived in
this country continuously for seven years.
O n l y  t h o s e  w h o  h a d  b e e n
convicted—either by plea or at trial—of a
crime that fell under the definition of an
“aggravated felony,” see 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43) (1994), and who had served a
prison term of at least five years were
statutorily ineligible for discretionary
relief.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994).
Even a defendant convicted of an
aggravated felony and sentenced to five or
more years’ imprisonment might have
maintained eligibility for § 212(c) relief
provided that he had not served five years
of his sentence by the time of his removal
hearing.
There was also a strong likelihood that
such relief would be granted: The Attorney
General granted it in over half of all cases
in which it was sought.  See St. Cyr, 533
U.S. at 296 & n.5.  Moreover, the relief
was predictably granted where certain
factors were present, including family ties
within the United States, residence of long
duration in this country, evidence of
hardship to the immigrant’s family as a
result of deportation, and a stable history
of employment.  See In re Marin, 16 I&N
8Dec. 581, 584-85 (BIA 1978).3
With IIRIRA, Congress repealed §
212(c) relief altogether and replaced it
with a provision that created a new and
significantly narrower form of relief called
“cancellation of removal.”  This form of
relief is now unavailable to any immigrant
who was convicted of an aggravated
felony, no matter the length of the
sentence.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.  The
definition of “aggravated felony” has been
retroactively expanded to include dozens
more offenses, including misdemeanor and
low-level felony offenses.  See 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43).  Courts have upheld the
application of the expanded definition of
“aggravated felony” to minor offenses.
See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco, 225
F.3d 148,  154  (2d  Cir.  2000)
(misdemeanor state theft of a video game
valued at $10, for which immigrant
received one-year suspended sentence, is
an aggravated felony); United States v.
Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 792 (3d Cir. 1999)
(misdemeanor crime of petty larceny is an
aggravated felony).
The practical effect of the repeal of §
212(c) relief, in conjunction with several
other statutory amendments, is that a far
larger number of immigrants are now
deportable under the new law, while a
much smaller number are eligible for any
form of relief from deportation.
Moreover, if the repeal is applied
retroactively to immigrants such as
Ponnapula, the practical effect is that it
will convert what was the mere possibility
of deportation into a certainty. 
B.
Since the principal authority governing
this case is Landgraf, we rescribe its
fundamental precepts.   There the Supreme
Court held that, absent a clear command to
the contrary from Congress, there is a
“ p r e s u m p t io n  a g a in s t  s ta t u t o ry
retroactivity.”  511 U.S. at 270.4  Without
such a clear statement, retroactive
application of a statute is impermissible
when it “would impair rights a party
possessed when he acted, increase a
party’s liability for past conduct, or impose
new duties with respect to transactions
already completed.”  Id. at 280.  In Martin
v. Hadix, the Court elaborated that the
    3Section 212(c) relief is governed by
predictable standards, “comparable to
common-law rules,” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at
296 n.5.
    4See also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265,
271, 271 n.25, 272, 273, 275 n.29, 277,
278, 279, 286 (referring, variously, to the
“presumption against retroactive
legislation,” the “presumption against
statutory retroactivity,” the
“antiretroactivity presumption,” and the
“traditional presumption against truly
‘retrospective’ application”); Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel.
Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 946, 947, 950,
951, 952 (1997) (same); Hadix, 527 U.S.
at 352, 367 (same); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at
316, 320, 324 (same); Republic of
Austria v. Altmann, No. 03-13, slip op. at
14, 17 (U.S. June 7, 2004) (same).
9question whether a new statute attaches
new legal consequences to prior conduct
“demands a commonsense, functional
judgment” that “should be informed and
guided by ‘familiar considerations of fair
notice, reasonable reliance, and settled
expectations.’”  527 U.S. at 357-58
(quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280).  Most
recently, in Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, the Supreme Court held that the
Landgraf line does not apply to the “sui
generis context” of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, slip op. at 18, but
nonetheless both the majority and dissent
expressly reaffirmed Landgraf’s “old and
well-established principle,” slip op. at 3
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also slip op.
at 13-18 (reaffirming but distinguishing
Landgraf).  The Altmann Court explained
that “the aim of the presumption is to
avoid unnecessary post hoc changes to
legal rules on which parties relied in
shaping their primary conduct.”  Slip op. at
17-18.
In St. Cyr, the Court applied the
principles of Landgraf in considering
whether IIRIRA’s repeal of discretionary
relief under former § 212(c) would have a
retroactive effect if applied to an alien who
was “convicted pursuant to a plea
agreement at a time when [his] plea would
not have rendered [him] ineligible for §
212(c) relief.”  St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320.
The Court first examined whether the
provisions repealing former § 212(c)
evinced a clear Congressional intent to
apply the repeal retroactively.  Concluding
that there was no such clear statement, see
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314-20, the Court next
considered whether applying the repeal
retroactively would be impermissible.  The
Court concluded that applying the repeal to
aliens “who entered into plea agreements
with the expectation that they would be
eligible for [§ 212(c)] relief” would
“‘attach[] a new disability, in respect to
transactions or considerations already
past’” and produce a retroactive effect.  Id.
at 321 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at
269).  The Court ultimately held something
somewhat more expansive: “We . . . hold
that § 212(c) relief remains available for
aliens, like respondent, whose convictions
were obtained through plea agreements
and who,  notwi ths tanding those
convictions, would have been eligible for
§ 212(c) relief at the time of their plea
under the law then in effect.”  Id. at 326.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court
focused on an alien’s reasonable reliance
on the possibility of discretionary relief
under former § 212(c) as one of the most
important factors prompting him to forego
trial and enter a plea agreement.  “Given
the frequency with which § 212(c) relief
was granted in the years leading up to . . .
IIRIRA,” the Court reasoned, “preserving
the possibility of such relief would have
been one of the principal benefits sought
by defendants deciding whether to accept
a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial.”
Id. at 323.  Indeed, “[t]here can be little
doubt that, as a general matter, alien
defendants considering whether to enter
into a plea agreement are acutely aware of
the immigration consequences of their
convictions.”  Id. at 322.  In support of its
conclusion that aliens who accepted plea
10
agreements prior to IIRIRA had a reliance
interest in § 212(c) relief, the Court
pointed to the quid pro quo at the heart of
criminal plea agreements.  Id. at 321.  “In
exchange for some perceived benefit,
defendants waive several of their
constitutional rights . . . and grant the
government numerous tangible benefits.”
Id. at 322 (internal quotation marks
omitted).  The Court concluded that
“[b]ecause [St. Cyr], and other aliens like
him, almost certainly relied upon [the]
likelihood [of receiving discretionary
relief] in deciding whether to forgo their
right to a trial, the elimination of any
possibility of § 212(c) relief by IIRIRA
has an obvious and severe retroactive
effect.”  Id. at 325.
C.
The crux of the government’s argument
is that the appeal is controlled by St. Cyr,
which it views as resting uniquely on the
existence of the quid pro quo of criminal
plea agreements.  The absence of this quid
pro quo here, the INS argues, causes
Ponnapula’s claim to fail.  Of course, the
unspoken premise of this argument is that
St. Cyr articulated the exclusive conditions
for impermissible retroactivity in this
context.
The Courts of Appeals for the Second
and Fourth Circuits have confined St. Cyr
to the plea-agreement context on the
understanding that a quid pro quo is
required.  See Swaby v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d
156, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2004); Rankine v.
Reno, 319 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2003);
Chambers v. Reno, 307 F.3d 284, 290-91
(4th Cir. 2002).5  Other Courts of Appeals
have also limited St. Cyr’s retroactivity
holding to the plea-bargain context without
specifically invoking the quid pro quo
language from St. Cyr.  See Montenegro v.
Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 2004)
(per curiam); Dias v. INS, 311 F.3d 456
(1st Cir. 2002); Armendariz-Montoya v.
Sonchik, 291 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2002);
Brooks v. Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 1268 (11th
Cir. 2002).  A related argument advanced
by the INS and in these cases is that the
immigrant has “rolled the dice” by going
to trial and thereby forfeited any claim to
certainty.  See, e.g., Chambers 307 F.3d at
291-92.
As we will explain, our interpretation
of Landgraf and its progeny differs
somewhat from these Courts’.  But even
accepting their understanding of Landgraf,
we think Ponnapula’s case distinguishable
from the cases cited above, with the
    5We have also suggested this in two
opinions, Chukwuezi v. Ashcroft, 48 Fed.
Appx. 846, 851 (3d Cir. 2002) and
Uspango v. Ashcroft, 289 F.3d 226, 230
(3d Cir. 2002).  Neither is binding on this
issue on this panel, however, see Third
Circuit IOP 9.1 (“Policy of Avoiding
Intra-Circuit Conflict of Precedent”): 
Chukwuezi is a not-precedential opinion,
and the discussion in Uspango of St. Cyr
is dicta because it is not necessary to that
opinion’s holding—that a removal
proceeding does not “commence,” for
purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 3.14 and
IIRIRA’s effective-date provision, with
an alien’s petition for asylum.
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possible exception of Swaby (with which,
at all events, we disagree).  We first
explain why we believe that other Courts
of Appeals have perhaps misapplied
Landgraf in this area, and we then show
why, even under the constricted and
questionable (but nonetheless prevailing)
view, Ponnapula’s somewhat unique
situation still demands that he be
considered for § 212(c) relief.
III.
A.
Because we disagree with other Courts
of Appeals’ application of Landgraf to the
question in this case, some background on
those Courts’ treatment of Landgraf is
necessary.  We treat the Second Circuit’s
opinion in Rankine as representative.
There, the Court laid out the Supreme
Court’s modern retroactivity doctrine with
citations to Landgraf, Hadix, and St. Cyr,
see Rankine, 319 F.3d at 98-99, much as
we have done above, see supra Part II.B.
The Court explained that the Rankine
petitioners’ “choice to go to trial puts
[them] on different footing [from St. Cyr]
in two crucial respects.”  Rankine, 319
F.3d at 99.
First, none of these petitioners
detrimentally changed his position
in reliance on continued eligibility
for § 212(c) relief.  Unlike aliens
who entered pleas, the petitioners
made no decision to abandon any
rights and admit guilt—thereby
immediately rendering themselves
deportable—in reliance on the
availability of the relief offered
prior to IIRIRA.  The petitioners
decided instead to go to trial, a
decision that, standing alone, had
no impact on their immigration
status.  Unless and until they were
convicted of their underlying
crimes, the petitioners could not be
deported.
* * *
Second, the petitioners have
pointed to no conduct on their part
that reflects an intention to preserve
their eligibility for relief under §
212(c) by going to trial.  If they had
pled guilty, petitioners would have
participated in the quid pro quo
relationship, in which a greater
expectation of relief is provided in
exchange for forgoing a trial, that
gave rise to the reliance interest
emphasized by the Supreme Court
in St. Cyr.  As the Court made
clear, it was that reliance, and the
consequent change of immigration
s ta tus , t h a t  p ro d u c e d  the
impermissible retroactive effect of
IIRIRA.  Here, petitioners neither
did anything nor surrendered any
rights that would give rise to a
comparable reliance interest.
Id. at 99-100 (citation omitted).
Three aspects of this opinion are
noteworthy.  First, neither in the passages
above, nor anywhere else in the opinion,
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does the word “presumption” appear,6 yet
the presumption against retroactivity is the
essence of the Landgraf line of cases.
Second, the passage above discussing a
detrimental change in position appears to
require actual reliance by the party seeking
to avoid retroactive application, yet the
Supreme Court has never required actual
reliance in any case in the Landgraf line.
Third, the Court’s objection that
“petitioners have pointed to no conduct on
their part” suggests that the party seeking
to avoid retroactive application bears an
evidentiary burden, another requirement
we are unable to locate in the Landgraf
line.  In the next section, we discuss in
detail our concern that each of these may
be unfaithful to Landgraf and its progeny.
B.
The Second Circuit’s lack of emphasis
on the presumption against retroactivity is
in considerable tension with the Supreme
Cou r t ’ s  consistent  t rea tmen t of
retroactivity analysis.  See supra note 4
(cataloging references to “presumption” in
Landgraf, Hughes Aircraft, Hadix, St. Cyr,
and Altmann).  The Supreme Court’s
framework for assessing the retroactivity
of civil laws has been consistently applied:
The Court first looks for a clear statement
from Congress that a statute is to be
applied retroactively, and will defer to
such a command.  See, e.g., Landgraf, 511
U.S. at 270.  But in the absence of a clear
command, a consistent line of cases
es tab l i shes  t h a t  “‘ c o n g r e ss i o n al
enactments and administrative rules will
not be construed to have retroactive
effect.’”  Id. at 272 (quoting Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,
208 (1988)).
Landgraf softens this apparently
categorical stance by recognizing that
another line of cases holds that “in many
situations, a court should ‘apply the law in
effect at the time it renders its decision,’
even though that law was enacted after the
events that gave rise to the suit.”  511 U.S.
at 273 (quoting Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 416
U.S. 696, 711 (1974)).  The Landgraf
Cou r t  c i t ed  as  examples  law s
“authoriz[ing] . . . prospective relief,” id.,
“ s t a tu t e s confe r r ing  o r  o us t in g
jurisdiction,” id. at 274, and “[c]hanges in
procedural rules,” id. at 275.  Harmonizing
these two lines, the Court explained:
When a case implicates a federal
statute enacted after the events in
suit, the court’s first task is to
determine whether Congress has
expressly prescribed the statute’s
proper reach.  If Congress has done
so, of course, there is no need to
resort to judicial default rules.
When, however, the statute
contains no such express command,
the court must determine whether
the new statute would have
retroactive effect, i.e., whether it
    6This is not strictly accurate: The
phrase “presumption against
retroactivity” does appear incidentally in
an extended quotation of another Court
of Appeals’ decision.  See Rankine, 319
F.3d at 102 (quoting Lara-Ruiz v. INS,
241 F.3d 934, 945 (7th Cir. 2001)).
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would impair rights a party
possessed when he acted, increase
a party’s liability for past conduct,
or impose new duties with respect
to transactions already completed.
If the statute would operate
retroac tively,  our traditional
presumption teaches that it does not
govern absent clear congressional
intent favoring such a result.
511 U.S. at 280.
Moreover, in Hughes Aircraft, the
Court explained that a “conten[tion] that
only statutes with one of these effects are
subject to our presumption against
retroactivity” would “simply misread[] our
opinion in Landgraf.”  520 U.S. at 947.
The Hughes Aircraft Court held that the
language quoted above “does not purport
to define the outer limit of impermissible
retroactivity,” but merely describes “a
sufficient, rather than a necessary,
condition for invoking the presumption
against retroactivity.”  Id.  Because the
Supreme Court has repeatedly couched its
holdings in this area in terms of a liberal
presumption—albeit one that arises only
conditionally, on a finding of retroactive
effect—we read Landgraf and its progeny
to hold that the presumption against
retroactivity is easily triggered, though not
automatic.7
Our disagreement with the courts that
have held that IIRIRA’s repeal of § 212(c)
relief is not impermissibly retroactive with
respect to aliens who went to trial is that
those courts have erected too high a barrier
to triggering the presumption against
retroactivity.  This has the effect of
treating Landgraf as establishing a
presumption in favor of retroactive
application, but such a presumption would
be wrong—the Supreme Court explicitly
held in Hughes Aircraft that the Court of
Appeals had erred by concluding that
Landgraf evinced a “strong presumption in
favor of retroactivity.”  520 U.S. at 950.
The Second Circuit’s su btle
heightening of the showing required to
t r igger the  presumpt ion  aga inst
retroactivity is also visible in that Court’s
apparent insistence that an alien show
actual reliance to reap the benefit of the
presumption against retroactivity.  It is a
strange “presumption,” in our view, that
arises only on so heightened a showing as
actual reliance (though as we explain, see
infra Part IV, Ponnapula actually has made
such a showing).  Relatedly, the Second
Circuit seems to require a quantum of
evidence regarding the subjective intent of
the party seeking to avoid retroactive
application; this too strikes us as being in
tension with the language of presumption
in Landgraf and its progeny; furthermore,
    7Parenthetically, we note that the
holdings and reasoning of Landgraf,
Hughes Aircraft, and Hadix are not
somehow inapplicable to laws about
deportation; the Court made plain in St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. at 325 n.55, that the
retroactive application of an immigration
law is analyzed no differently from the
retroactive application of any other civil
statute.  
14
such a requirement incorrectly focuses
attention on the particular facts and
circumstances of the party before the
court.
The Supreme Court has never required
actual reliance or evidence thereof in the
Landgraf line of cases, and has in fact
assiduously eschewed an actual reliance
requirement.  Landgraf, Hughes Aircraft,
Hadix, and St. Cyr all establish this.  In
Landgraf, the question was whether the
Civil Rights Act of 1991’s addition of
compensatory and punitive damages
remedies to certain Title VII suits could be
applied retroactively to reach pre-
enactment conduct.  The Court concluded
that the remedies could not be applied
retroactively, but it reached this conclusion
without once referring to the defendant’s
conduct or the defendant’s actual
expectations.  In fact, the defendant (USI
Film Products) is not even mentioned in
the pertinent section of the Court’s
opinion.  See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280-
93.  Indeed, it is difficult to see how USI
Film Products could  have proven its actual
reliance on the absence of a punitive
damages provision.
Likewise, in Hughes Aircraft, the
particular situation or expectations of the
defendant were immaterial to the Court’s
analysis.  Hughes Aircraft was brought
under an amendment to the False Claims
Act that eliminated a defense to certain qui
tam suits.  Hughes Aircraft argued that the
elimination of the defense could not be
applied retroactively, and the Court
agreed.  Again, the Court evaluated the
retroactivity question in the abstract,
without reference to Hughes Aircraft’s
conduct or expectations, see Hughes
Aircraft, 520 U.S. at 947-52, and it is
again difficult to see how the defendant
could have established its actual reliance
on the prior state of the law.
Ha dix  conce rned Co ngre ss ’s
amendments to the fee provisions
applicable to post-judgment monitoring in
prison reform suits.  The amendments
capped the hourly fee recoverable on
behalf of attorneys performing such
monitoring.  Attorneys for Hadix, one of
the named plaintiff prisoners in the suit,
claimed that the amendment was
impermissibly retroactive because it
reduced their hourly rate for work
performed before the effective date of the
amendment (because it had already been
performed) and for work performed after
the effective date of the amendment
(because the attorneys could not ethically
withdraw from the case until the prison
reform decree was terminated).  The Court
agreed with the former position, see
Hadix, 527 U.S. at 358-60, but rejected the
latter because the attorneys “provide[d] no
support for [their] assumption” about their
ethical duties, id. at 361.
Important for our purposes is not the
result, however, but the Court’s reasoning.
Hadix differs from Landgraf and Hughes
Aircraft in that Hadix does in fact refer to
the particular situation of the party seeking
to avoid  retroac tive applicat ion.
Nonetheless, the Hadix Court’s discussion
focuses not on the bona fides of the
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attorneys’ claimed actual reliance,8 but
instead on whether reliance was (or would
have been) reasonable.  See, e.g., id. at
360 (“To impose . . . new standards now,
for work  perform ed be fore th e
[amendments] became effective, would
upset the reasonable expectations of the
parties.”); id. (“After [the date of the
amen dmen t], any expectation of
compensation at the [pre-amendment] rates
was unreasonable.”).
St. Cyr is the most recent case in the
Landgraf line.  As with Hughes Aircraft
and Landgraf itself, the analytical focus of
the opinion is not on the facts and
circumstances of the party before the
Court.  The Court briefly considered the
putative actual reliance of Enrico St. Cyr
and a similarly situated alien, Charles
Jideonwo, but did so merely for illustrative
purposes.  See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323.  St.
Cyr is principally concerned with the
reasonable reliance interests of aliens who
enter into plea agreements as a class.  To
that end, the discussion of the quid pro quo
in criminal plea agreements is directed at
establishing, as a general matter, the
reasonable reliance of this class of aliens,
irrespective of the course of St. Cyr’s own
plea negotiations.9
Moreover, the St. Cyr Court’s language
does not require concrete certainty about
the exact historical motives and actual
reliance and expectations of each alien
who pled guilty.  We set out several
examples in the margin.10  On the whole,
    8For example, the Hadix Court did not
cite affidavits or other representations
from the attorneys that they actually
relied on the higher hourly fee in electing
to perform the monitoring services.  For
that matter, it is not inconceivable that
attorneys engaged in such a practice
might have performed their services with
or without the marginally greater
inducement of the higher pre-amendment
fees.
    9Indeed, the presence of a quid pro
quo is excellent support, in an
evidentiary sense, for the existence of a
reliance interest, since a quid pro quo
supplies two archetypal predicates for a
reliance interest: foregoing a right (here,
the right to a trial) and conferring a
benefit (here, saving the government the
costs and uncertainty of prosecution).  
    10See, e.g., St. Cyr., 533 U.S. at 323
(“[P]reserving the possibility of [§
212(c)] relief would have been one of the
principal benefits sought by defendants
deciding whether to accept a plea offer . .
. .” (emphasis added)); id. (“Relying
upon settled practice, the advice of
counsel, and perhaps even assurances in
open court that the entry of the plea
would not foreclose § 212(c) relief, a
great number of defendants in
Jideonwo’s and St. Cyr’s position agreed
to plead guilty.” (emphasis added)); id.
(referring to plea agreements “that were
likely facilitated by the alien’s belief in
their continued eligibility for § 212(c)
relief” (emphasis added)); id. at 325
(“[R]espondent, and other aliens like
him, almost certainly relied upon [the]
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we think the Supreme Court regarded St.
Cyr as a clear and straightforward result
flowing from Landgraf; to paraphrase
counsel for the amici curiae at oral
argument, St. Cyr was an easy case on the
retroactivity issue.
Thus the Supreme Court has avoided
an “actual reliance” formulation in favor
of a “reasonable reliance” formulation in
its retroactivity analysis.  “Reasonable
reliance” is specifically highlighted in
Hadix, 527 U.S. at 357-58 (holding that
retroactivity analysis “should be informed
and guided by ‘familiar considerations of
fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled
expectations.’”).  The likelihood that the
party before the court did or did not in fact
rely on the prior state of the law is not
germane to the question of retroactivity.
Rather, courts are to concentrate on the
group to whose conduct the statute is
addressed—in Landgraf it was employers
subject to Title VII; in Hughes Aircraft it
was government contractors; in Hadix it
was attorneys performing prison reform
monitoring services; in St. Cyr it was
a l i e n s  w h o  a c c e p t e d  a  p l e a
agreement—with a view to determining
whether reliance was reasonable.
The Landgraf line also establishes that
a change in law can be found
imperm issibly retroact ive without
establishing that some (or all) members of
the group affected by the change in law
relied on the prior state of the law.  For
example, it is unlikely that in Landgraf any
employer demonstrably relied on the
absence of a punitive damages remedy for
Title VII violations, or that in Hughes
Aircraft any government contractor
purposely arranged its billing practices ex
ante to take advantage of a specific
defense under the False Claims Act.
Likewise, in St. Cyr, the Court found it
sufficient that the plea agreements of
deportable aliens were “likely facilitated
by the aliens’ belief in their continued
eligibility for § 212(c) relief.”  533 U.S. at
323 (emphasis added).  And indeed the
Court’s holding is not limited to those
aliens who actually relied on the
availability of § 212(c) relief:  “We . . .
hold that § 212(c) relief remains available
for aliens, like respondent, whose
convictions were obtained through plea
agreements and who, notwithstanding
those convictions, would have been
eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time of
their plea under the law then in effect.”  St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326.
The holding in St. Cyr then is simply
not subject to a qualification that the alien
seeking the opportunity to pursue § 212(c)
relief must have accepted a plea agreement
that necessarily preserved his eligibility for
§ 212(c) relief (i.e., a plea agreement that
provided for release from incarceration in
less than five years’ time).  We find this
significant because it further confirms that
Landgraf’s limitations on the repeal of
former § 212(c) are construed broadly in
favor of those who had even a partial or
contingent reliance interest in the existing
state of the law—for example, an alienlikelihood [of § 212(c) relief].”
(emphasis added)).
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who accepted a plea agreement with a six-
year term of imprisonment that, through
good behavior credits and the like, could
be shortened to less than five years’ time.11
C.
We have established that the question
we must answer is whether the repeal of §
212(c) relief is impermissibly retroactive
with respect to aliens who elected to go to
trial (or some relevant subset thereof).
Stated another way, we ask what aliens—if
any—who went to trial and were convicted
did so in reasonable reliance on the
availability of § 212(c) relief.  If
Ponnapula is among this group, we must
affirm the District Court’s grant of habeas
corpus relief.  We conclude that he is.
As noted above, in St. Cyr, the
Supreme Court found that all aliens who
accepted plea agreements had some
reliance interest in the potential
availability of § 212(c) relief.  The Court
concentrated its discussion on the alien’s
decision whether to accept the plea
agreement.  This focus is logical because
the reliance interest of an alien who
accepts a plea agreement arises at the time
the choice is made to accept the
agreement.  Generally speaking, reliance
interests (in the legal sense) arise because
some choice is made evincing reliance.
Cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
90 (1981) (requiring “action or
forbearance” to invoke promissory
estoppel).
Accordingly, we focus on the choice
made by aliens who went to trial and were
convicted prior to the effective date of
IIRIRA’s repeal of former § 212(c).12  We
    11Indeed, St. Cyr himself accepted a
plea that provided for a ten-year
sentence, with execution suspended after
five years.  See Brief for the Petitioner at
11 n.7, St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (No. 00-
767), 2001 WL 210189.  If he had
actually served the full five-year
unsuspended portion of his sentence, St.
Cyr would have been ineligible for
discretionary relief under § 212(c).  See
INA § 212(c) (depriving the Attorney
General of the power to withhold
deportation for “an alien who . . . has
served . . . a term of imprisonment of at
least 5 years” for certain crimes).  Thus,
even St. Cyr himself did not accept a plea
that guaranteed his eligibility for §
212(c) relief.
    12We acknowledge that our focus here
on the decision of the alien to go to trial
is somewhat in tension with our holding
in Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552 (3d
Cir. 2002), that an alien whose date of
conviction for an aggravated felony falls
after the effective date of IIRIRA is
ineligible for § 212(c) relief on any
theory; it is virtually certain that some
aliens chose to go to trial before
IIRIRA’s effective date, but were
actually convicted after the effective
date.  We cannot, of course, overrule
Perez.  See Third Circuit IOP 9.1
(“Policy of Avoiding Intra-Circuit
Conflict of Precedent”).  The tension
with Perez need not detain us long,
however, because the parties stipulated
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may subdivide this category into (1) aliens
who went to trial because they declined a
plea agreement that was offered to them,
and (2) aliens who went to trial because
they were not offered a plea agreement.
Because aliens in the latter category had
no opportunity to alter their course in the
criminal justice system in reliance on the
availability of § 212(c) relief, we highly
doubt (though do not explicitly hold, for
the issue is not before us) that such aliens
have a reliance interest that renders
IIRIRA’s repeal of former § 212(c)
impermissibly retroactive as to them.
As for the former category, we hold
that aliens such as Ponnapula who
affirmatively turned down a plea
agreement had a reliance interest in the
potential availability of § 212(c) relief.
For many aliens, the reliance interest is
obvious and significant—Ponnapula
himself has such a reliance interest
because the then-existing parameters for
former § 212(c) eligibility would so
obviously factor into the decision-making
of someone in his position.  (Specifically,
Ponnapula needed to ensure that, however
the larceny charge was resolved, he would
serve less than the five years specified in
former § 212(c).)  This conclusion is
buttressed by the Supreme Court’s
recognition that the availability of
discretionary relief plays a central role in
many aliens’ decisions regarding whether
to accept a plea agreement.  See St. Cyr,
533 U.S. at 322-23.  Though St. Cyr
concentrated on the many aliens who
ultimately accepted plea agreements, it is
not reasonable to believe that all aliens
who rejected plea agreements thereby
disclaimed any interest in § 212(c) relief;
in fact, quite the contrary is true.  There
are many reasons to proceed to trial—the
lack of a plea agreement that would ensure
eligibility for § 212(c) relief, the hope of
an acquittal, or the simple desire to
exercise fundamental constitutional
rights—but few if any of them are
inconsistent with preserving a contingent
interest in § 212(c) relief.
A case about aliens who accept plea
agreements (i.e., St. Cyr) is relatively
straightforward because the availability of
§ 212(c) relief was very likely a dominant
factor in their decision.  This case may
seem harder because making the decision
to go to trial is perhaps more complex and
more nuanced, but we should not let that
obscure the fact that former § 212(c) was
one of a host of factors considered by
aliens who elected that course—and, per
the Court’s discussion in St. Cyr, a
significant factor at that.
To be sure, there are aliens who would
appear to have had a very attenuated
reliance interest in the availability of §
212(c) relief—for example, aliens charged
with the most serious of crimes, carrying
the longest prison sentences, who turned
below that Ponnapula’s date of
conviction for IIRIRA purposes
(December 20, 1994) was prior to the
effective date of IIRIRA (April 1, 1997). 
See Ponnapula, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 399
n.6.  To accommodate Perez we simply
limit our holding to aliens convicted
before the effective date of IIRIRA.
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down unattractive plea agreements.
Preserving eligibility for discretionary
withholding of deportation was probably
not foremost in such aliens’ minds, for
they had the slimmest of chances to qualify
for § 212(c) relief.  But the fact that an
interest may have been attenuated,
however, has had little salience in the
Supreme Court’s analysis of other
retroactivity questions.  For example, ex
ante it was unlikely that Hughes
Aircraft—or any given government
contractor—would need to avail itself of a
specific defense against a qui tam action;
or that USI Film Products—or any given
employer subject to Title VII—would find
itself accused of discriminatory conduct
meriting punitive damages.  In neither case
would anyone have claimed, ex ante, that
the affected companies had anything more
than a highly contingent—and thus
seriously attenuated—interest in the then-
existing state of the law.13
Moreover, in St. Cyr itself, as we have
discussed above, the Court extended its
holding to all aliens who had accepted plea
agreements; some of these aliens
necessarily had attenuated reliance
interests in the availability of § 212(c)
relief (for example, consider the
hypothetical alien described above who
accepted a plea bargain with a six-year
term of imprisonment, subject to good-
time credits).  The St. Cyr Court’s
explanation that “the fact that § 212(c)
relief is discretionary does not affect . . .
our conclusion,” 533 U.S. at 325, is also
consistent with our understanding of how
attenuated interests are to be treated in a
retroactivity analysis:  Attenuation of this
kind generally does not render reliance
unreasonable.14
    13With respect to monitoring services
already performed, Hadix presents a case
at the opposite pole.  There, the affected
attorneys necessarily had an interest in
the statute that set their maximum hourly
rate.  But this reveals only that Hadix
was a relatively easy case—and indeed,
the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in
the attorneys’ favor on the issue of
monitoring services already performed. 
See Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (opinion of the
Court); id. at 362 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment);
id. at 364 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).  Hadix thus
does not speak to the question of
reasonable but attenuated reliance
interests.
    14“Attenuation” as we have discussed
it in the text refers to the idea of one
present consideration (among many)
having only a minority influence on an
actor’s ultimate decision.  There is
another sense of “attenuation,”
however—one connoting causal
remoteness.  For example, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
properly noted that “‘it would border on
the absurd’ to argue that an alien would
refrain from committing crimes or would
contest criminal charges more vigorously
if he knew that after he had been
imprisoned and deported, a discretionary
waiver of deportation would no longer be
available to him.”  Lara-Ruiz, 241 F.3d
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Finally, if it was reasonable in St. Cyr
for an alien to rely on the attenuated
availability of § 212(c) relief in accepting
a plea agreement, we see no reason why it
would be unreasonable for the same alien
to likewise rely in declining a plea
agreement.  The reasonable reliance
question turns on the nature of the
statutory right and the availability of some
choice affecting that right, not on the
particular choice actually made.  In sum,
because aliens such as Ponnapula who
affirmatively turned down plea agreements
had a reliance interest in the potential
availability of § 212(c) relief, we hold that
IIRIRA’s repeal of §  212(c) is
impermissibly retroactive with respect to
such aliens.  While this statement seems
broad, it is faithful to St. Cyr, which
painted with broad strokes:  “We . . . hold
that § 212(c) relief remains available for
aliens, like respondent, whose convictions
were obtained through plea agreements
and who, notwithstanding those
convictions, would have been eligible for
§ 212(c) relief at the time of the plea under
the law then in effect.”  533 U.S. at 326.
This reflected approval of Judge Oakes’s
opinion for the Second Circuit, St. Cyr v.
INS, 229 F.3d 406 (2d Cir. 2000), which
adopted the same categorical approach:
“[W]e hold that the bar on applying for
relief enacted in AEDPA § 440(d) and
IIRIRA § 304 does not apply to an alien
who pled guilty or nolo contendere to an
otherwise qualifying crime prior to
IIRIRA’s enactment date.”  Id. at 421.15
Accordingly, Ponnapula is entitled to
apply for discretionary withholding of
deportation under former § 212(c).16
at 945 (quoting LaGuerre v. Reno, 164
F.3d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 1998)).
    15Moreover, on a practical level, the
difference between this holding and a
more circumscribed one is smaller than it
first appears.  For some aliens sentenced
to terms of five years or longer
(following their rejection of plea
agreements), there is a chance of serving
less than five years, and preserving
statutory eligibility for § 212(c) relief. 
Cf. supra note 11 (noting that St. Cyr
would not necessarily have been
statutorily eligible for § 212(c) relief). 
But the majority of aliens convicted of
lengthy sentences will find that this
opinion removes IIRIRA’s bar to relief
only to leave them foundering on the
shoals of statutory ineligibility under
former § 212(c) itself.
    16We note in passing that, in
comparison to the holding in St. Cyr, the
effect of our overall holding is likely to
be small.  First, the class of aliens
affected by this ruling is constantly
shrinking in size as the effective date of
IIRIRA recedes into the past.  Second, as
we note in the preceding footnote, many
aliens who are within the scope of this
holding will nonetheless be statutorily
ineligible for § 212(c) relief by reason of
having served five years or more in
prison.  Third, many times more criminal
defendants enter into plea agreements
than go to trial.  See St. Cyr 533 U.S. at
322 n.47.  Thus, for the vast majority of
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* * *
In this Part, we have set out our view
of the most faithful application of the
Landgraf line to the case at bar.  We
recognize, however, that the other Courts
of Appeals to address cases like
Ponnapula’s have taken a rather different
approach to the retroactivity question.
Though we stand on the foregoing
analysis, we will also analyze Ponnapula’s
case under the rubric employed by those
other Courts.
IV.
A.
We have described the background of
facts, all uncontradicted and accepted by
the District Court, which demonstrate
that Ponnapula played a minor and
essentially unknowing role in the
fraudulent scheme.  We incorporate these
facts by reference here.  The best
description of Ponnapula’s pretrial
posture is supplied by the declaration of
his trial counsel, Alexander E. Eisemann,
Esq., in support of a motion for a
temporary restraining order in the
District Court.  In pertinent part,
Eisemann’s declaration states as follows: 
At one point prior to
petitioner’s trial, Assistant District
Attorney David Steiner offered to
allow him to plead guilty to a
misdemeanor with a probationary
sentence.  Petitioner considered
the offer and the immigration
consequences of pleading guilty
and going to trial.  He realized
that even if he were convicted of a
felony after trial he would still be
eligible for hardship relief from
deportation pursuant to section
212(c) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, see 8 U.S.C. §
1182(c) (1994).  Moreover, his
counsel advised him that, if
convicted after trial, he would
likely receive a sentence of less
than five years’ imprisonment and
that he would, in all likelihood,
receive a sentence of only one to
three years’ imprisonment.  
In reliance on these facts,
petitioner declined the
misdemeanor offer and proceeded
to trial.
App. 56-57.
In short, as the District Court noted:
Here, there can be no doubt that
Petitioner conformed his conduct
to match his settled expectations
of immigration law.  Petitioner
was offered an opportunity to
plead guilty to a misdemeanor
which would have had no
immigration consequences, but
turned down the plea because
“even if he were convicted of a
removable criminal aliens, the
retroactivity of IIRIRA’s repeal of
former § 212(c) was settled nearly three
years ago by St. Cyr, so the decision we
announce today affects a much smaller
group of aliens.
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felony after trial he would still be
eligible for hardship relief from
deportation pursuant to § 212(c).”
235 F. Supp. 2d at 405 (quoting
Eisemann Decl.).
We stress that Ponnapula actually
relied on the state of the law in rejecting
the misdemeanor plea agreement and
going to trial.  Notably, none of the court
of appeals cases treating St. Cyr as
requiring a quid pro quo involved actual
reliance by the immigrant on the then
state of the law.  Also, in these cases the
charges (and the sentences) facing the
immigrant were far more serious than
those facing Ponnapula.  For example, to
recur to the cases cited supra Part II.C,
Rankine was charged with attempted
murder, his co-petitioner Lawrence, a
repeat offender, was convicted of a mid-
level drug offense, and his co-petitioner
Eze was convicted of first degree rape.17 
See Rankine, 319 F.3d at 96-97. 
Theodoropoulos was convicted of a high-
level drug conspiracy.  See
Theodoropoulos v. INS, 313 F.3d 732,
734 (2d Cir. 2002).  Montenegro was
convicted of possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute, see Montenegro, 355
F.3d at 1036, as was Armendariz-
Montoya, Armendariz-Montoya, 291
F.3d at 1118.  In none of these cases does
the record reflect or even suggest a plea
agreement was offered, or that the
defendant had reasonable assurance that
his sentence would be less than five
years.18  Thus Ponnapula’s case seems
distinguishable on its facts, both in that
Ponnapula has demonstrated actual
reliance where the aliens in other cases
did not, and in that Ponnapula’s offense
was significantly less grave.
B.
We must also engage the rationale of
these cases.  As will appear, while that
rationale will support the result reached
on the facts of those cases, any attempt to
apply it to deny relief in Ponnapula’s
case falls of its own weight or at least
cannot survive rigorous scrutiny.  We
treat Rankine as representative.  In
arriving at its result, the Court relied
principally on selected parts of the
Supreme Court’s opinion in St. Cyr:
The [Supreme] Court focused on
the fact that plea agreements are a
form of quid pro quo where, “[i]n
exchange for some perceived
benefit, defendants waive several
of their constitutional rights
(including the right to a trial) and
grant the government numerous
tangible benefits.”  [St. Cyr, 533
U.S.] at 322 (internal quotation
omitted).  Recognizing that §
    17Lawrence and Eze were also resident
aliens seeking the same relief as
Rankine.
    18Swaby was convicted of burglary and
possession of marijuana.  See Swaby, 357
F.3d at158.  While this case may be
closest to Ponnapula, the Swaby panel
felt itself bound by Rankine and did not
consider the matter de novo.  See id. at
162.
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212(c) relief was frequently
granted prior to the enactment of
AEDPA and IIRIRA, the Court
found that “preserving the
possibility of such relief would
have been one of the principal
benefits sought by defendants
deciding whether to accept a plea
offer or instead to proceed to
trial.”  Id. at 323.
The Court also highlighted the
“clear difference, for the purposes
of retroactivity analysis, between
facing possible deportation and
facing certain deportation.”  Id. at
325.  Because there was a
“significant likelihood” that
resident aliens would receive §
212(c) relief prior to IIRIRA, the
Court found that aliens “almost
certainly relied upon that
likelihood in deciding whether to
forgo their right to trial,” id., and
instead to plead to sentences that
would preserve their eligibility for
such relief.  Without the
possibility of relief, these pleas
guaranteed the aliens’ removal;
the elimination of § 212(c),
therefore, changed the legal effect
of their pleas and unsettled their
reliance.  The Court concluded
that “it would surely be contrary
to ‘familiar considerations of fair
notice, reasonable reliance, and
settled expectations’ to hold that
IIRIRA’s subsequent restrictions
deprive them of any possibility of
such relief.”  Id. at 323-24
(quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at
270) (internal citation omitted).
Rankine, 319 F.3d at 99.  The Court
conceded that St. Cyr did not directly
control the outcome, but then opined
that:
We cannot, however, ignore the
strong signals sent in those
opinions that aliens who chose to
go to trial are in a different
position with respect to IIRIRA
than aliens like St. Cyr who chose
to plead guilty.
Id.  We agree, for it is clear that St. Cyr
does not control the outcome.  But for
reasons explained above, see supra Part
III, we do not agree that relevant
jurisprudence contains “strong signals”
that aliens who go to trial are in a
different position from those who plead
guilty.
The wellspring of Rankine and its
companion cases is a concern for actual
reliance.  Though we have explained why
we do not believe that this is the best
rendering of Landgraf, we accept that
here as a starting point for the sake of
argument.  What becomes critical, then,
is how to prove reliance.  We agree that
the kind of quid pro quo inherent in the
acceptance of a plea agreement is one
way to prove reliance; as we note above,
the action and forbearance implicit in a
quid pro quo is strong evidence of
reliance.  But it is surely not the only way
to establish reliance, much less the
talisman that the INS makes it out to be.  
An individual can rely or have settled
expectations about a state of affairs
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without having to enter into an exchange
to secure or assure it.
From our discussion above of the lack
of concern in the Landgraf line for actual
reliance, it should go without saying that
there is no mention of a quid pro quo or
surrender of constitutional rights in
Landgraf, Hughes Aircraft, or Hadix. 
Neither is there any mention of a quid
pro quo in our decision in Mathews v.
Kidder, Peabody & Co., 161 F.3d 156,
164 (3d Cir. 1998):
In this case, the events in question
are the alleged fraudulent acts by
the defendants.  If the RICO
Amendment is applied to this
case, it would attach new legal
consequences to these events. 
Before the Amendment, the legal
consequences included liability
under the federal securities laws
and RICO; after the Amendment,
the legal consequences included
liability only under the securities
laws.  
Focusing then on new legal
consequences to Ponnapula himself, they
surely have occurred here.  Ponnapula
relied on the advice of counsel.  It is hard
to imagine that Ponnapula would not
have accepted the misdemeanor plea
offer if he had known about the risk of
being ineligible for § 212(c) relief.  And
as the District Court concluded,
“[a]defendant who goes to trial believing
that his opportunity to seek § 212(c)
relief is secure, is as equally disrupted in
his reasonable and settled expectations as
is a defendant who accepts a plea
believing it to confer such a benefit.” 
235 F. Supp. 2d at 404.
We do not gainsay that the existence
of a quid pro quo (for a guilty plea)
justified the result in St. Cyr.  But to the
extent that the Court in St. Cyr noted that
plea agreements involve a quid pro quo
between the criminal defendant and the
government and a waiver of several
constitutional rights, see 533 U.S. at 322,
these statements do not create an
additional requirement necessary to
establish retroactive effect.  In our view,
these statements only serve to highlight
the obvious and severe retroactive effect
of applying IIRIRA to aliens who
pleaded guilty; in other words, the quid
pro quo notion comfortably fit the case. 
What Rankine and its companion cases
have done is to convert quid pro quo into
a rigid baseline test, to ossify the
language of St. Cyr into a test that the
Supreme Court simply never mandated
and we are unwilling to create.
In a variation on this theme, the
government argues that “Ponnapula’s
simple expectation or reliance is not the
same as the heightened expectation of
relief which the St. Cyr aliens brought at
the price of their constitutional rights and
paid for with the immediate certainty of
deportation.”  The Rankine Court used
similar rhetoric: “The petitioners here
assumed no similarly heightened
expectation from their decision to go to
trial.”  319 F.3d at 100.  We find no basis
for a “heightened expectation” standard
in St. Cyr or elsewhere in the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence, and we reject it.
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We have not here reviewed in detail
each of the court of appeals cases that
have rejected extending St. Cyr to
immigrants who were convicted at trial
before IIRIRA.  Suffice it to say that the
holdings in these cases are largely the
result of the courts’ failure to be
convinced that immigrants who chose to
go to trial could possibly have relied on
the availability of 212(c) relief.  As the
Ninth Circuit stated in rejecting this
argument: “Unlike aliens who pleaded
guilty, aliens who elected a jury trial
cannot plausibly claim that they would
have acted any differently if they had
known [that their decision would later
make them ineligible for 212(c) relief].” 
Armendariz-Montoya, 291 F.3d at
1121(emphasis added); see also Dias,
311 F.3d at 458 (“It follows that, having
been convicted after a trial where there
was not, and could not have been,
reliance by the defendant on the
availability of discretionary relief,
[petitioner] may not argue that the statute
has impermissible retroactive effect as to
him.” (emphasis added)).  This argument
may be forceful given the serious charges
facing the immigrants in those cases, see
supra Part IV.A, but it withers in
Ponnapula’s case where, as we have
explained, the immigrant conformed his
conduct to the settled expectations of
immigration law that there would be no
adverse immigration consequences of
going to trial.
C.
Another notion that appears in the
other court of appeals cases is that of
“rolling the dice.”  In Chambers, the
Court opined that the petitioner there did
not possess “a reliance interest
comparable to that which was at the heart
of St. Cyr,” 307 F.3d at 290, because “by
rolling the dice and going to trial,
Chambers actually ensured that his
eligibility for discretionary relief would
remain uncertain,” id. at 291.
We find the “roll the dice” metaphor
unhelpful, at least in this case.  While
Ponnapula may have “rolled the dice” in
terms of guilt or innocence at trial, he did
not do so with respect to immigration
consequences in view of his reasonable
expectation that there would be no
adverse immigration consequences of
going to trial.  We do not generally speak
of rolling the dice when the odds are
stacked extremely heavily in one’s favor. 
Assuming that the metaphor is applicable
to someone, it does not apply to
Ponnapula, because (to extend the
metaphor), Ponnapula was (retroactively)
deceived as to what was riding on the roll
of the dice.  Neither do we find
persuasive the arguments that Ponnapula
gave up “certainty” and should not be
rewarded for “guessing wrong.”  These
notions are inconsistent with our
explanation of Landgraf.19
    19We feel constrained to note that the
notion that Ponnapula should be
penalized so harshly, ipso facto, for
going to trial, in the hopes of avoiding
the disgrace and permanent stain of a
conviction, seems to run counter to
fundamental principles of the American
26
A related argument pressed by the
government is that there can be no
reasonable reliance in this case because
there was a risk that Ponnapula might
have been sentenced to more than five
years in prison—and that, thereafter, he
might have served more than five years
in prison—thereby making him ineligible
for § 212(c) relief.  But Ponnapula was in
fact sentenced to a maximum of three
years in prison (and served even less),
and the fact that counsel’s advice proved
to be correct buttresses the conclusion
that it was reasonable for Ponnapula to
rely on his counsel’s advice in making
his immigration decisions.  The
government would compare Ponnapula’s
risk of serving more than five years with
the risk to the immigrant in St. Cyr.  In
fact, however, as we note above, see
supra note 11, St. Cyr himself faced a
greater term of imprisonment.  Thus, the
government is simply incorrect when it
states that the immigrant in St. Cyr
“pursued a litigation strategy that
ensured his eligibility for section 212(c)
relief.”
V.
In sum, approaching the issue in this
case from the first principles of Landgraf
retroactivity analysis, and rejecting the
actual-reliance approach of our sister
Courts of Appeals, we conclude that
Ponnapula is entitled to pursue § 212(c)
relief.  Accordingly, the judgment of the
District Court granting Ponnapula’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus will
be affirmed.20
constitutional polity, which encourages
citizens to assert their innocence when
convinced that they are not guilty of an
offense, and go to trial.
    20We will, however, vacate the District
Court’s determination that Ponnapula is
entitled to a bond hearing.  The District
Court should reevaluate its holding on
that issue in light of the intervening
Supreme Court decision in Demore v.
Kim , 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
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